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Abstract. 
Malware such as banking Trojans are popular with financially-motivated cybercriminals. Detection of banking 
Trojans remains a challenging task, due to the constant evolution of techniques used to obfuscate and 
circumvent existing detection and security solutions. Having a malware taxonomy can facilitate the design of 
mitigation strategies such as those based on evolutionary computational intelligence. Specifically, in this paper, 
we propose a cyber kill chain based taxonomy of banking Trojans features. This threat intelligence based 
taxonomy provides a stage-by-stage operational understanding of a cyber attack, can be highly beneficial to 
security practitioners and the design of evolutionary computational intelligence Trojans detection and mitigation 
strategy. We evaluate the proposed taxonomy using a real-world dataset of 127 banking Trojans collected from 
December 2014 to January 2016 by a major UK-based financial organisation. 
Keywords: Cyber Kill Chain; Banking Trojans; Banking Trojans Taxonomy; Evolutionary Computational 
Intelligence-based Trojans Detection 
I. Introduction 
In our current Internet-connected society, e-commerce and e-government (e.g. e-banking and e-payment 
systems) are becoming the norm in developing and developed nations. Such systems and services can and have 
been targeted by cyber criminals   [1],[2], [3], [4],[5], and malware is a popular or common tool used by cyber 
criminals [6]–[8]. For example, a cyber attack in South Korea reportedly saw 32,000 computers belonging to 
broadcasting organizations and banks infected with a malware that overwrote the Master Boot Record (MBR) 
[7].  Also, in 2013, the Crypto-Locker ransomware reportedly infected more than three million machines, 
causing more than 6 million USD worth of damages [9]. Malware can be broadly categorized into adware and 
spyware, virus, worm and Trojans [10], [11],[12], [13] [15]. The focus of this paper is Trojans, and more 
specifically banking Trojans, due to their capability to facilitate the hijacking or acquiring of online banking 
credentials and other sensitive information (e.g. credit card details), which are then sent through a backdoor to a 
Command and Control (C&C) infrastructure [16], [17].  
While malware detection and mitigation research is not new, effectively detecting and mitigate malware remains 
challenging due to the constant evolution of malware and malware authors [18]. Cyber Kill Chain (CKC) is one 
of the most widely used operational threat intelligence models to explain intrusion campaigns activities [19], 
[20]. CKC is based on the kill chain tactic of the US military’s F2T2EA (find, fix, track, target, engage and 
assess) [21], and contains seven stages/steps as shown on Figure II.1 [19]–[24].  
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Figure ‎I.1 Lockheed Martin CKC steps 
Reconnaissance includes the identification, selection and profiling of potential targets. In Weaponisation, a 
cyber weapon is built by, say combining a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) with an exploit code (exploit kits), and 
efforts are made to minimize the risk of detection and investigation by the victim. In Delivery, the cyber weapon 
is transmitted to the victim(s) environment. Exploitation is the triggering / activating of the malicious payload in 
the target environment. During Installation, the cyber weapon allows the adversary to preserve its access and 
deliver more payloads to the victim environment. In Command and Control (C2), the adversary establishes 
communication with the compromised host(s). Finally, in actions on objectives, an adversary takes planned 
activities on target(s) (i.e. exfiltration of data) to achieve the intended goals.  
Taxonomies are important tools to organise the knowledge and understanding of existing problems and solution 
space [25]. For example, Weaver et al., proposed a taxonomy of computer worms based on the worm target 
discovery and selection strategies, carrier mechanisms, activation, and payloads [26]. Jacob et al., proposed a 
taxonomy for malware behaviours and divided malicious programs based on their behaviour into two main 
families namely simulation-based and formal detectors [27]. Lindorfer et al., suggested a taxonomy for malware 
evasive behaviours based on detecting environmental variables [28]. Ugarte-Pedrero et al., suggested a 
taxonomy for malware packers based on their runtime complexity measurement and code obfuscation method 
[29]. Karim et al.,  proposed a taxonomy for mobile botnets [30]. With emergence of mobile malwares, a 
taxonomy for mobile malware behavioural detection was proposed [31] followed by an android malware attack 
vectors taxonomy based on attackers modus-operandi [32]. Khattak et al., proposed taxonomies of botnet 
features and botnet detection and prevention techniques [25]. Dagon et al., developed a taxonomy of botnets 
structure depicting botnets key metrics and response strategies [33]. Gupta et al., proposed a taxonomy of 
various types of phishing attacks and defence solutions [34]. Rodríguez et al., proposed a taxonomy of POS 
(Point of Sale) RAM scraping malwares behaviour [35].  
In this paper, we propose a CKC-based taxonomy for banking Trojan features which can be used to inform 
detection and mitigation strategies, such as those based on evolutionary computational intelligence. The 
taxonomy is then evaluated using 127 banking Trojan samples collected from December 2014 to January 2016 
from a real-world banking environment in the UK (see Appendix I). To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first Trojan taxonomy based on CKC.  
We will explain our proposed Banking Trojans features taxonomy in the next section.
II. Proposed Banking Trojans Features Taxonomy 
As Trojans are not used for target selection or profiling, the CKC Reconnaissance phase is not applicable to our taxonomy. However, Trojans have features relevant to 
Weaponization, Delivery, Exploitation, Installation, C2 and Actions on Objectives as discussed in this section. Based on the 127 Trojan samples collected from a real-world 
banking environment in the UK (see Appendix I), we present the proposed banking Trojans features taxonomy in Figure III.1. Appendix II presents the mapping between the 
collected Trojans’ features and our suggested Trojan features taxonomy. 
 
Figure ‎II.1. Taxonomy of Banking Trojans Features based on cyber kill chain. 
Weaponization 
Weaponization is an essential step to increase success of an attack by reducing opportunities for attack detection 
and limiting forensics investigators abilities to analyse detected threats[36]. Banking Trojans are employing 
variety of techniques to disguise detection on host-level and network-level and defeat cyber investigators.  
Host-based Evasion 
Host-based cyber defence is mainly relied on Anti-Virus (AV) and end-point security solutions installed on 
the host machines, which scans for known virus signatures or detect and limit malicious behaviours [37], 
[38]. Banking Trojans are using different techniques to install themselves on a host while remain undetected 
as follow. 
Embedding Malicious Code Within Benign Applications: Embedding a malicious code within a benign 
payload (application) using techniques such as process hollowing [39]–[42] would allow a malicious 
program to run within a known good process space and evade AVs detection even if the malware 
signature exists in the AV database [43], [44]. Adversaries that embed their executables within benign 
applications will infect the host next time that the benign app is called [38], [44], [45]. Client application 
data files such as Adobe Portable Document Format (PDF) or Microsoft Office documents are often used 
in this stage [21]. Out of 127 banking Trojans analysed in this research (shown in Appendix I), 96% 
utilised Microsoft Office and 4% utilised PDF. 
Heap Spraying; in this technique, malicious (shell) codes are divided into several pieces that are loaded 
in different locations on the heap memory so there is no single chunk of data mapped to any AV’s 
signatures [45]. This technique not only reduces the chance of attack detection but increases the 
possibility of successful attack as adversary does not need to know the exact shell-code address in the 
heap but piece together shellcode elements using pre-defined gadgets[46]. As an example, Trojan 29 (see 
Appendix I - MD5 hash of ab40142988527fe6ce585a9fdfce56ca) has leveraged this technique to avoid 
detection.  
Network-based Evasion 
Firewalls and Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS) are the most common forms of network 
protection mechanisms. Similar to any other protection mechanism, the network perimeter defence solutions 
are having their own limitations i.e. a malicious document attached to an email is likely to bypass IDS while 
an executable would be subject to heavy scrutiny [43], [47]. Banking Trojans are using different techniques 
to avoid network-based detection as follow: 
Utilisation of Common Protocols and Ports; in this technique, the Trojan only utilises very common 
protocols and ports to conduct its malicious intents. Most Trojans are using protocols like HTTPS, DNS, 
and HTTP on ports such as 443, 53 and 80. This technique reduces the chance of port being restricted on 
the network perimeter and the communication being detected as malicious [25]. With the use of common 
ports, Trojans can communicate with their C2s, download payloads, and upload exfiltrated data. 
Network Spoofing; Spoofing is the art of deceiving someone by impersonating origin of a malicious 
content as if it is coming from a known good and reliable source. Symantec reported 74% of spam 
campaigns used real companies domain in the sender’s address [48], [49]. Most banking Trojans 
obfuscate their origin to well-known companies’ domains which are local to their victims (i.e. using 
British Telecom (BT), and Royal Mail for targets within UK) to to avoid being blacklisted on network 
perimeters, detected and/or identified by any other means including by the end users themselves [50]–
[57].  
Anti-Forensics Techniques 
Attackers not only evade detection mechanisms but try to make it difficult for forensics examiners to 
understand their techniques, tactics and procedures[58]. Tools that are used by legitimate programmers to 
protect their programs from tampering or deter reverse engineers can be used to pack and obfuscate 
malwares to throw investigators off track [44], [59], [60]. Obfuscation is deliberate act of disguising codes to 
make investigation more difficult. Similar to other malwares Banking Trojans are employing different 
obfuscation techniques as follow [60], [61]: 
Dead-Code Insertion; this technique involves adding ineffective instructions to a programme to change 
its appearance but maintain its behaviour [59]–[61]. It could be as simple as adding “NOP” instructions 
in the malware code or putting hundreds of code lines which are never executed or serve no purpose [46], 
[59]. This technique is quite often used and 76 of Trojans analysed have indicated utilisation of this 
technique (see Appendix II). While this technique could be circumvented by removing ineffective 
instructions prior to analysis, detecting those instructions is quite time consuming[61]–[66]. 
Utilising Packers; in this technique the malware encrypts its main body and only include a decrypting 
module which decode encrypted instructions at run time  [59], [60]. This technique creates difficulties in 
static code analysis and code reversing [26] as investigator should either extract instruction from memory 
dumps or write/find a decryption tool [44], [60], [67]. Moreover, parkers change malwares signature 
hence, makes the Trojan invisible to signature-based detection technologies [19], [29], [31], [37]. 
Delivery 
Once adversaries have completed Weaponization stage they should find a way to deliver their malicious payload 
to intended targets [25], [68]–[70]. The most common methods of malicious payload delivery by banking 
Trojans are email attachments, social engineering and drive by download [19]–[21], [71]. 
Email attachments  
Email communication is heavily utilised in most organisations and often associated with an office document 
or PDF attachment. These attachments may contain malicious codes in the form of macros (Microsoft Office 
documents) or Java Scripts (PDF files) [47], [72].  Once a user enables macros in an office document it may 
download a payload that contain a Trojan. Similarly if a PDF is viewed by a privileged user, a JavaScript can 
be automatically launched to run a malicious shellcode [73], [74]. Since anti-virus software often fail to 
detect these hidden malware and there is a good chance for users to run the file this mechanism becomes 
highly effective for delivering Trojans [43], [47], [72]. 
Social Engineering  
Attackers that uses banking Trojans like Dridex, Zeus and Spyeye widely explored social engineering to 
prey on user’s weaknesses, hoping the recipient will press a link to open a malicious web page or an 
attachment with embedded malicious code [43], [47], [72]. According to Symantec report [75] on Dridex 
campaign attackers have sent 271,019 disguised as financial emails e.g. invoice, orders and receipts between 
Nov 2015 to Jan 2016  to deliver their Trojan. This is a form of social engineering to lure a victim to open 
the attachment thinking it’s something of importance but the attachment contains a malware that is activated 
through macros or Javascript embedded on the document[76]–[78]. 
In our dataset, we found 122 Trojans that are delivered using office documents and 5 delivered using PDF 
files (see Appendix II). 
Drive-by Download 
This mechanism utilises active contents such as a JavaScript or ActiveX [25] to make the users knowingly 
(by authorizing to run the active content) or unknowingly download attackers malicious contents while 
browsing a compromised or specially crafted web page [25], [71]. Adversaries may include the malicious 
code in a seamless object like an advert or a widget and eventually lure a victim to download a Trojan 
without intending to do so [71].  
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Exploitation 
After delivery of the malware, intruders’ code should be triggered on the target machine by running the 
malicious application or exploiting a system vulnerability [19]–[21]. A successful exploitation may lead to 
exfiltration of private information, injection of code into web applications, log keystrokes, steal passwords, steal 
cookies or download other modules that may perform intended malicious activities. Banking Trojans are 
utilising a variety of techniques for exploitation which can be categorised into Web injection, key stroke logging 
and API hooking.  
Webinject  
Trojans are equipped with a functionality called web-inject [17], that can silently modify a webpage on the 
infected victim’s machine to intercept private credentials such as username, password and even 2nd factor 
authentication credentials [16], [17]. Two main features are mostly utilised for web injection by banking 
Trojans as follow: 
Form Grabber: this is one of the famous techniques deployed for example by SpyEye Trojan, to 
manipulate and inject arbitrary contents into data transmitted between an HTTP(s) server and a client 
browser [16], [17]. The module is placed between the browser rendering engine and the HTTP(S) API 
function, so that the Trojan has access to decrypted data even if an encryption is utilised (e.g. SSL). In 
this mechanism, the Trojan presents the victim browser with a web page which is almost identical to the 
requested online banking site, while web form fields contents such as username and password are 
intercepted by the Trojan. 
Userland Rootkits; In this technique the Trojan uses communication API hooking to inject its malicious 
code during initialization of victim’s web browser and intercepts and manipulates web traffic [16]. Zeus 
v.2 is a well-known Trojan leveraging this technique by manipulating WININET.DLL library in loading 
of Internet Explorer by hooking high-level API communication functions such as HttpQueryInfoA, 
HttpSendRequestA, InternetReadFile, InternetReadFileExA, etc., in user-mode. Therefore, the Trojan 
can conveniently intercept data before it gets encrypted in sessions secured by HTTPS[16].  
Keystroke Logging  
In Keystroke logging an adversary covertly records user's keystroke as they are being typed either through a 
software program or a hardware device or even by monitoring electromagnetic emissions. Deployed through 
variety of methods, malware programmers often leverage software key loggers as a payload or a client-side 
exploit [79], [80]. Software based keystroke logging can be implemented in kernel, hypervisor or in 
memory. 
Kernel-based Keystroke Logging; this technique requires privileged access to the victim machine since 
the malware should run as root or system administrator. This type of keystroke logging is facilitated by 
kernel-mode rootkits, where by the rootkits modify the kernel code (for example system calls) or kernel 
data to change the kernel behaviour in order to enforce stealthy capabilities to hide malicious activities 
i.e. kernel level keystroke logging [81]. Keystroke logging done at this level are immune to techniques 
that reveal user-mode activities [81]–[83]. 
Hypervisor-based Keystroke Logging; This type of Trojans resides on hypervisor level which is “Ring -
1” [81] lower than kernel (i.e. “Ring 0”). Therefore, these Trojans are much more stealthier giving more 
control to attackers. Virtual Machine Based Rootkits (VMBR) install a virtual machine monitor (VMM) 
underneath the existing operating system that facilitates hypervisor keylogging by Trojans. 
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Figure ‎II.2. System structure of machine before and after infection of VMBR.  
Once a machine is infected the malware can modify the VMM's emulated network card and log all 
network packets or use virtual-machine introspection to trap instructions and reconstruct data from the 
target system whilst being invisible to the target OS[82]. Since virtual-machine introspection can trap all 
SSL socket write calls, clear text data can be logged before being encrypted [82]. 
In-Memory Injection; this keylogging mechanism can be achieved by patching memory tables or 
injecting directly into a process memory. Direct Memory Access (DMA) technique is usually used for 
injecting a key logger into a process [84], [85]. As memory injection happens at user level, attacker only 
requires similar privilege as injecting process for successful deployment of a keystroke into the process 
memory  [80]. 
API Hooking 
API hooking is a technique by which the behaviour and flow of applications can be influenced and modified 
through inserting memory break point and JMP (jump) instructions. API functions manipulations on system 
libraries such as Kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll and ntdll.dll can provide a privileged access to attackers [16]. 
Inline hooks, and Import Address Table (IAT) hooks are the main API hooking techniques implemented by 
different banking Trojans. 
Inline Hooking: this is a common Windows API hooking technique that replaces the byte code of an 
API function with a code redirection instruction to a code section controlled by the Trojan [16]. The 
allocation of 5 bytes of NOPs (No-OPeration) at the beginning of every Windows system function for hot 
patching provides needed space for Trojan  to implement an unconditional jump [16].  
Import Address Table (IAT) Hooks: whenever a Windows loader loads a PE (Portable Executable) file 
an IAT is filled with the virtual address of all functions or variables that are called or imported by the 
executable (DLL) [16], [86]. An IAT hook, overwrites the original destination of an imported API 
function and points it to the attacker code. Therefore, executing the application would load and run 
attacker codes as well.  
Installation  
In this stage the adversaries try to extend their access to more systems and compromise more nodes. Trojan 
developers often use tactics that are not easily detectable like DLL side loading and Heap Spray for a successful 
installation [19], [21]. 
DLL Side-Loading 
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Windows allows applications to load DLLs by either specifying full path of the DLLs or using DLL 
redirection, or utilising a manifest [87]. If none of these locate the DLL, then Windows will perform a search 
through predefined directories like WinSxS [87]–[89]. Attackers abuse this feature by putting their malicious 
DLLs in higher priority locations than original location of benign DLLs, hence the application would load 
the malicious DLLs instead [87]. With the use of Windows’ Side-by-Side (WinSxS or SxS) a Trojan can 
load any malicious DLL from i.e. %WINDIR%\WinSxS (e.g. 
C:\Windows\WinSxS\x86_microsoft.windows.common-
controls_6595b64144ccf1df_6.0.9600.16384_none_a9f4965301334e09) [87]. 
Heap Spray 
This technique increases the chance of successful attack because attackers do not need to know the exact 
location of their malicious code in heap [46]. The heap spraying attack insert as many malicious code blocks 
as possible into the heap [46]. Therefore, even if a benign application hits malware codes resided in the heap, 
the shellcode will be executed and the malware will be running. 
Command and Control (C2) 
This is a mechanism by which a malware registers to its Command and Control (C&C) server [19]–[21], [25], 
[69]. Malware are registering on a C&C domain to receive commands or upload exfilterated data. A Trojan may 
find its C&C server through hard coded IP addresses or through domain lookup.  
Hard Coded IP Address 
This mechanism provides the C&C address by means of static IP address coded in the malware binary or by 
means of seeding [25]. In seeding the programmer provides the Trojan with an initial list of active peers in 
the botnet which are hidden anywhere on the infected machine with an elusive name to make it difficult to 
be detected. This mechanism is considered primitive since reverse engineering of the Trojan can easily lead 
to retrieval of the IP addresses or may even lead to detecting the actual Botmaster. 
Domain Lookup 
The use of domain name system (DNS) is also very common among banking Trojans [90]. Unlike IP 
addresses, domain lookup provides stealthier tactical advantage to the malware developers due to its more 
complex nature. This mechanism has several advantages from the attacker’s perspective such as: 
 Any IP address can be linked to the domain name by the attacker, hence defeating IP blocking 
defence solutions. 
 Completely blocking all the IPs linked to a domain name can be almost impossible as the attacker 
may reroute the traffic through several bots (stepping stones) before reaching the true Botmaster. 
 Taking down a domain is complicated as it requires a lot of formalities. 
Attackers have several options to include a domain name in their Trojans as follow: 
Hardcoded; Pre-defined domain names are hard-coded in the strings of the binary like in the case of IP 
address [25]. Attackers may have obtained different domain names that the victim is often visiting and 
try to host their Trojans on those or similar domains. 
Cache Poisoning; attackers can magnify their malicious response using either web cache or even 
browser cache of a single user. If the response of websites is cached, attackers can manipulate the cached 
responses and redirect the victim to a different location (DNS cache poisoning attack) [19], [91]. This 
mechanism may produce different domain names each time the malware restarts and creates more 
polymorphic behaviour hence a stealthier malware.  
Generated Domain Names; The domain name can be dynamically generated by an algorithm (Domain 
Generation Algorithm) that is known to the attacker and the malware[25], [70]. Unlike cache poisoning 
this mechanism produces random domain name depending on the algorithm which also creates more 
polymorphic behaviour of the malware and makes it even  stealthier [68], [70]. The difference between 
this technique and the cache poisoning attack is that in the cache poisoning the malware makes use of the 
domain cached in victim DNS while in this mechanism the malware produces a random domain name 
[19]. 
Out of 127 analysed Trojans 22 had IP addresses hardcoded while 13 utilised DNS only while the rest were 
using a combination of both IP and DNS for C2 (see Appendix II). 
Actions on Objectives 
After an attack has completed all other steps in the kill chain what is left is to accomplish its objectives which 
could be data exfiltration and/or system disruption [19]–[21]. Banking Trojans are mainly exfilterating data 
through a backdoor, FTP (File Transfer Protocol) or even Web and mobile apps. 
Backdoors 
Attackers often install a secret exit that allows them to send, receive or control victim machines remotely 
which is known as backdoor [34], [37]. Backdoor can be described as a feature or defect of a computer 
system that allows surreptitious unauthorized access to data [3], [92]. 
HTTP-based backdoors are very common in banking Trojans, due to their easiness in bypassing connection 
restrictions and detection. Moreover, the POST and GET commands are of the utmost interest when it comes 
to data exfiltration, both by receiving and sending data [35], [23]. 112 out of 127 Trojan samples in our 
dataset make use of backdoors for C&C communication via GET/POST HTTP requests (see Appendix II). 
Other than file upload, backdoors provide other means or advantages to attackers like remote login or even 
in-depth reconnaissance without users’ knowledge[9], [19], [32]. 
Web Application 
Trojans use MITB (Man-In-the-Browser) or MITM (Man-In-The-Middle) techniques to extract data [16], 
[93]–[95]. In MITB a Trojan redirects the victim to a phishing website that is controlled by the adversaries to 
harvest credentials such as username, password etc. [93], [94]. In MITM the adversary goes further by 
intercepting communications from victims and responses from server and establishing an interactive process 
for collecting users data [95], [96]. 
III. Proposed Banking Trojans Defence Taxonomy 
In developing a banking Trojans defence taxonomy, we consider three dimensions, namely: detection, prevention and remedial actions [97]. The first level of our taxonomy 
comprises different types of defences, and the second level is constructed based on how a specific defence type can be applied. Detection techniques can run at the host or at 
the network [98], while prevention techniques are classified as host-based, network-based and user training. Finally, remedial actions are divided into defensive and offensive 
activities; each linked to different techniques [25]. 
  
Figure ‎III.1. Banking Trojan Defence Taxonomy.
Detection 
Detection techniques provide opportunities to identify a malicious attack in its early stages i.e. during 
reconnaissance, weaponisation or delivery  [19], [21]. Detection can be conducted on host or network level. 
Host Based Detection 
The most common host based detection tools are AntiVirus (AV) software which utilise two detection 
methods namely signatures-based or behavioural-based [2], [37], [44].  
Signature-Based; Signature can be list of domains which are known to be malicious or hashes of the 
known malware [37]. These signatures are stored in a large repository for the sake of comparison for 
malware detection [37], [78], [99].  
Hashes; hashes can either be MD5 or SHA, this mechanism is mostly preferable due to it consistence 
and accuracy [37]. AV vendors usually utilise a generic signature which is hash of the code segment 
to detect malware samples belong to the same family [37], [38]. 
Email Signatures; Trojans can spoof sender’s address to reflect well known organisations such as 
banks, power companies and post office. A signature based on these known malicious trends can be 
created along with a blocking rule on an IDS to prevent users from receiving such emails [100], 
[101]. Although this strategy can be easily bypassed by adversaries, it is still effective in the absence 
of adversaries’ knowledge of being shunned. 
Behavioural Based; this type of detection aims to identify actions performed by malwares and trends of 
events rather than syntactic markers to identify an attack [27], [78], [102]. Behavioural/heuristic 
technique of detection can be either static or automated, although automated techniques are more 
practical than static ones [103]. While we appreciate the applicability of signature based detection in real 
life application, heuristic becomes more prominent as they can provide deep and effective analysis to 
determine if a file is malicious or not [103]–[105]. The reason this technique is most effective is because 
the behaviour of each trojan can be emulated in a sandbox and analysed. Of course, the associated 
disadvantages include false positives and consumption of resources. 
Network Based Detection 
Network based detection techniques can be  can be categorised into active or passive [2], [69]. 
Active Detection; this technique involves interaction with information resources. Once a malware is 
detected a comparison is made with a set of previously generated malicious signatures [106]. The main 
active detection techniques are signature-based or network behaviour and timing based.  
Signature-Based: IDS like SNORT uses sets of signatures to determine if an event is malicious or 
not [69]. The comparison could be based on simple features such as header of an email address, the 
sender’s domain name or more complicated such as comparing an email with the blacklisted domains 
or known malicious activities. Of course this technique is vulnerable to zero-day attacks [107] as 
signatures will not be available in the database. 
Network Behaviour & Timing; in this technique, the comparison is based on features such as if the 
connection is coming from a known malicious IP address, known vulnerable ports, or even analysis 
of dishonest requests. Moreover, timing of sent requests can be used as a feature to determine if they 
are robot made or human made i.e. multiple request in very short period of time usually signifies a 
bot origin  [108], [109]. 
Passive Detection; in this technique, we achieve detection through monitoring activities initiated by 
applications to distinguish between malicious Trojans and benign apps. In passive detection, the defender 
remain undetected and gather as much information as possible without spooking the adversary[106]. 
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Following techniques can be used to hat detect malicious activities in C&C and Data exfiltration stage of 
an attack: , 
Packet Inspection; when a Trojan is in rallying or exfiltration phase many indications of 
maliciousness can be observed by finding connections to a known blacklisted domains or IP 
addresses [110]. We can also observe payloads of individual packets from contents of GET or POST 
requests to deduce what the Trojan is sending or receiving [23]. 
Analysis of Flow Records; this technique considers the flow of the entire traffic instead of individual 
packets. In this technique several attributes of communication streams are looked at such as source 
and destination addresses, port numbers, communication protocol, the duration of a session, and the 
cumulative size and number of transmitted packets[110]. With such attributes a detection matrix can 
be constructed to detect malicious activities not only in rallying and data exfiltration stage of the 
banking Trojans but also in the delivery stage. 
Analysis Of Spam Records; As Trojans are mostly delivered though unsolicited emails (referred to as 
spam) [110], analysis of these emails can lead to establishment of a pattern or a detection matrix . 
Filters can be set to scan for specific fingerprints from subject headers, message bodies, white and 
even black lists email addresses [100], [101].  
Analysis of Application Log Files; analysis of logs is not so different than spam emails, except that 
logs come from different sources i.e. firewalls, applications, servers etc.! The biggest challenge is 
analysing logs on a timely manner to detect malicious or just abusive behaviour of an application or 
users of the systems generating the logs [111], [112]. When a trojan runs on a machine one can 
discover from a log file what files the Trojan has created, deleted, or DLLs that are injected etc. 
Preventive 
After a successful detection and information gathering of any attack, what follows next is putting in place 
safeguards to prevent future attacks. Preventive techniques can be categorized into host-based, network-based 
and user training.   
Host Based 
When considering prevention at the level of host machine, anti-malware, anti-spyware and other tools are the 
most commonly used [37]. With good enough detection signatures this technique is very useful though not 
all Trojans can be detected and prevented easily due to the variant created by adversaries. Recent Symantec 
security product [75] has highlighted its capability in detecting and preventing attacks from Dridex malware. 
The product has highlighted the capability of scanning attachments of the incoming emails on host level and 
preventing users from opening malicious attachments.  
Network Based 
When casting a wider net for prevention on your network, things tends to get complex but in a long run it’s 
much easier managing attacks from their point of entry to your network rather than managing attacks on 
individual host machines. Some organisations have achieved this through implementation of SMTP and 
HTTP/SSL proxies [38], whereby all traffic from the internet towards organisations’ internal  network must 
pass these gateways which provides extra layer of security. Moreover, these gateways can be configured 
with email filtering rules i.e. any incoming email will be assessed in correlation with the rules set and the 
system will decide if an email should be allowed into the network or not. Some organisations have done this 
by deploying network Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS). While one may argue the importance of having 
IPS while firewall already exist, the truth is firewalls themselves have limitations. Firewalls can block 
traffics basing on IP blocks and ports while an  IPS monitors all traffic entering and exiting the network 
[113]. With organisations hosting webserver applications like Apache and Microsoft IIS, relying on firewall 
alone is ill-advised hence, having an IPS on your layered defensive security provides assurance while 
maintain functionality. The advantage of using an IPS as opposed to IDS is the ability of IPS to stop or 
redirect attacks pre-emptively [113]. With this feature an IPS is capable of redirecting attacks to the 
honeypot machine luring the attackers to believe success while giving the analyst ample time to analyse the 
attack and understand it in depth.  
User Training 
With ISO 27001 standard in play as a minimum requirement the provision of awareness training to all 
employees is mandatory. If users understand that most of the current Trojan attacks are based on spam 
campaign and receive appropriate training and act accordingly many Trojan attacks were never happened 
[114]. Furthermore, understanding that a Microsoft document or attachment may contain embedded malware 
will also give users a perspective on how to treat received attachments from a known or unknown sender. 
 Remedial 
As part of defence strategies, a consideration of safeguard failure should always be accounted. In the event 
safeguards against Trojan attack were not successful, we need sets of remedial actions that enable us to revert 
the system to a point of proper functionality. Remedial activities can be divided into defensive and offensive. By 
defensive we are looking at the actions to be taken after infection to bring your system back to normal, prevent 
spreading of the infection and repetition of the infection. On offensive side, we are looking at the actions that 
allow us to gather more intelligence about an attack, get an insight of the attacker and possibly trace the attack 
to its origin with the sole purpose of dismantling the Trojan infrastructure. 
Defensive Strategies 
Once an infection has been identified, we need strategies to bring the system back to its normal 
functionalities. Even these steps have merits and demerits but with a good plan we can recover from an 
attack as quickly as possible. We further classify defensive strategies into those dealing with an individual 
host machine and those concerned with the entire network. 
Host-based: on the host machine, several steps can be taken to remediate from a Trojan infection among 
which disinfection or reinstallation can be considered.  
Disinfection; this simply means removing the Trojan from the infected machine. We know the 
ultimate non-functionality of Trojan is receiving a STOP or KILL command from its controller. If by 
technical means an investigator can figure out the Trojan self-destruction mechanism, it can be 
triggered to remove the infection [110]. However, there are off-shelf programs such as Trojan 
removal kits that can be used although their ultimate effectiveness is hard to guarantee.  
Reinstallation; A complete reinstallation of an infected machine should be considered as the last 
option if disinfection is not viable as it takes longer time and involves much more activities. If a disk 
image of a clean installation is available, the process can be well shortened, otherwise a clean 
installation from preferred OS disk should be considered. 
Network-based: when the infection has spread to more than just one machine then the strategy should 
also span out accordingly. There are two main techniques for network based remedy of Trojans as 
follows: 
Quarantine (Walled-garden): isolating machines with symptoms of malware infection either by 
seeing their connections to a known C&C or malicious downloads and uploads [25], [110] is referred 
as walled-garden. Isolated machines are denied access to any other website except for the ones for 
remedial activates until the machine(s) is/are properly cleaned and pass security policies checks.  
Block C&C: Trojans are receiving instructions from a controller (C&C server) and send collected 
information to C&C. Once a C&C server IP address is identified we need to block communication to 
the address to prevent Trojans from receiving instructions or sending information to the controller. 
The other way to deal with this is by only allowing traffic to known addresses and block all other 
communications to unknown addresses in the network.  
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Offensive strategies 
The idea here is intelligent gathering while protecting live environment, and ultimately paralysing the Trojan 
botnet. With offensive strategies skiing on the edge of the line of legality and ethics, one needs to be very 
careful as attacking back is not only unethical but illegal too. 
Honeypot Or Padded Cell Systems: Honeypots are legal traps, intentionally deployed in a network to 
detect or deflect unauthorised access to a system [2], [110], [115]. Honeypots contains no business data 
so any access to the honeypot is malicious. Honeypots are used to research and study attacks and 
discover new information about the strategies and practices used by malware creators. With honeypots 
two kinds of information can be gathered. First is type of attack vectors in operating systems and 
software used along with the actual exploit code and second are attackers activities performed on an 
exploited machine [110]. 
Padded cells and honeypot use similar concept, but the distinct difference between the two systems is 
that, padded cells are highly protected and cannot be easily compromised as compared to honeypots 
[116]. In other words, padded cell is a hardened honeypot and operates in tandem with traditional IDS. 
With such systems in place, Trojan understanding becomes clearer to an organisation security team and 
better defence mechanisms are constructed with high percentage of certainty about future trends. 
Distribution of Fake Credentials; The main goal of a banking Trojans is online banking credentials, or 
credit and debit card details [110]. By identifying where stolen information is being submitted by a 
Trojan (also known as drop zone), crafted false and target-oriented information can be injected into these 
drop zones [25], [110], [117]. Therefore, mistrust between botmaster and their customer will be created 
and possibly run some players out of business and the entire malicious infrastructure may become 
useless. By associating the credentials with a monitored account, banks can trace the money and find 
where it is being transferred to and perhaps apprehend a botmaster [110]. 
Spam Trap; Most Trojans are being distributed by spam campaigns [110]. Spam trap can be used to 
capture as much of the spam emails for further analysis. Spam trap is considered as the email address 
with no functionality other than receiving unsolicited emails [118], [119]. The simplest setup of this trap 
is by advertising an email into many newsletters and forum to make it known so attackers will send their 
spam to that address. The evaluation of spam message along with its attachment and included links can 
assist security analysts to deduce information about malware families and even lead to detection of 
unknown families. 
Most of the defence techniques like IDS and/or IPS are used both for detection and prevention but we should 
understand their limitations too. Defence techniques highly depend on correct and up to date information. 
For instance, detecting an embedded Trojan in an office document by an IDS system can be difficult but if 
the IDS system is properly configured on both network perimeter and host the chance of detection increases. 
Likewise, detection of signatures highly depends on the software in use, but with the consideration of up to 
date signatures and continuous maintenance/update of the software, organisation may not face difficulties in 
detecting attacks. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
While evolutionary computational intelligence approaches are a viable approach to designing intelligent and 
effective malware detection and mitigation solutions, having a features taxonomy can help inform the design of 
such approaches by reducing the impreciseness, subjectivity, and knowledge uncertainty in decision making 
process.  
In this paper, we presented the first Cyber Kill Chain (CKC)-based taxonomy which details banking Trojans, 
based on real-world samples. Cyber defenders can then use the taxonomy to design their banking Trojans 
detection and mitigation strategy, including those based on evolutionary computational intelligence approaches.  
In the future, we plan to extend this taxonomy to cover other malware families as well as implementing the 
defence taxonomy using evolutionary computational intelligence (i.e. proof-of-concept) for deployment and 
evaluation.  
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Appendix I 
Allocated 
Name MD5 Hash 
Allocated 
Name MD5 Hash 
Allocated 
Name MD5 Hash 
Trojan1 cd238c1dab76a4336db727cdcbdcfc13 Trojan44 cacb79e05cf54490a7067aa1544083fa Trojan87 f5aee45ce06f6d9f9210ae28545a14c6 
Trojan2 c8247ee42c27364c3c33def68102241e Trojan45 265f3b610aed3745ba19fd795a748e57 Trojan88 b8d83b04a06b6853ad3e79a977dd17af 
Trojan3 2feb35e572e0339735804c42184f422b Trojan46 59b8bdd04ca78f3ac74f0d2bd414a9cf Trojan89 6e5654da58c03df6808466f0197207ed 
Trojan4 eadafc9b1891c74bc13e09c46c4a40c9 Trojan47 c9678ee6a19547fb213126fba9f6036d Trojan90 1fac282d89e9af6fd548db2c71124c38 
Trojan5 c96abe929eb587cb2913b638df368b3b Trojan48 eca90bf0af7db8ac5ec7993761f97f49 Trojan91 5bddf5271b1472eca61a6a2d66280020 
Trojan6 01078f660f979b30e4624e57cf986b6c Trojan49 514622A1797D9916637EED7833CFD5AF Trojan92 eb7df68bd7eb7cf2968cf541af3472d6 
Trojan7 104528e67f01168e12cdac550fc43260 Trojan50 fc4a4449246bbec022339618665a1976 Trojan93 50e3407557500fcd0d81bb6e3b026404 
Trojan8 000b2347b8fe2cc625861d7ed3ec834f Trojan51 f3b124852d90b5b32d03131e77b3ac2c Trojan94 c6cefd2923164aa14a3bbaf0dfbea669 
Trojan9 dc92858693f62add2eb4696abce11d62 Trojan52 fbca3b9e23ef33b25e74be7511dcecc1 Trojan95 b227c91fbc1ba56e9f01ab4f1e2e502f 
Trojan10 96f3aa2402daf9093ef0b47943361231 Trojan53 585381110056b63957a22e6aef59a31e Trojan96 2845499946fd5882f94cc9a4375b364a 
Trojan11 e4cc002a95caaf4481cb7140bbe96c58 Trojan54 66120bf739f2d53ef930194165eb5d09 Trojan97 37ceca4ac82d0ade9bac811217590ecd 
Trojan12 a4e14c88da9e1a74cd7c26ded99b6a0a Trojan55 66120bf739f2d53ef930194165eb5d09 Trojan98 D752837D0EE0E5D49D1F72F52279948E 
Trojan13 e8cd8be37e30c9ad869136534f358fc5 Trojan56 0D02257EC18B92B3C1CF58B8CB6B3D37 Trojan99 289af95f99f58c751a7d1d0a26d7cdb3 
Trojan14 3e3a09644170ad3184facb4cace14f8a Trojan57 48d496afc9c2c123e1ab0c72822a7975 Trojan100 289af95f99f58c751a7d1d0a26d7cdb3 
Trojan15 03ab12e578664290fa17a1a95abd71c4 Trojan58 373c9e5461c2b234f70e4d6102198eff Trojan101 e25a05d3fecceb14667048c07494d65f 
Trojan16 e46dcc4a49547b547f357a948337b929 Trojan59 b5d68075a093c263fb3392cb92d92bef Trojan102 4c3d0e0a944fc6755a28452e913e0347 
Trojan17 2ecf5e35d681521997e293513144fd80 Trojan60 ea4bbf027eb58b92566eb4d98002f976 Trojan103 1de3889fde95e695adf6eadcb4829c6d 
Trojan18 6c784bec892ce3ef849b1f34667dccac Trojan61 e14f089df621262bcbf172b5a5346d33 Trojan104 e4bb8a66855f6987822f5aca86060f2c 
Trojan19 673626be5ea81360f526a378355e3431 Trojan62 148112df459ba40b9127f7d4f1c08df2 Trojan105 7f0076993f2d8a4629ea7b0df5b9bddd 
Trojan20 02492b954b48f13412a844d689d064f1 Trojan63 ee265704cf0a371029ed28e958e06549 Trojan106 39837c6ba74a922f935d184d8f0f0d7b 
Trojan21 1FC2ABEC9C754E8CC1726BF40E0B3533 Trojan64 154faec2f2ac9c0fb028680e0e0ee78c Trojan107 999ebe8b65caf99faf1172074d7e5d3c 
Trojan22 e52a8d15ee08d7f8b4efca1b16daaefb Trojan65 a49149e8822c5c692cd71736a513d268 Trojan108 74dc37b7aabf745eac1d5fc65428488e 
Trojan23 e52a8d15ee08d7f8b4efca1b16daaefb Trojan66 53ba28120a193e53fa09b057cc1cbfa2 Trojan109 a5c52bd47f7fdfd54a2584a669eabe59 
Trojan24 DA26ED1B6FE69D15A400B3BC70001918 Trojan67 a29122dfa93bcac56ab9e5e05ac1d41a Trojan110 6c14578c2b77b1917b3dee9da6efcd56 
Trojan25 6aa26f04b22b284dda148ce317f53de8 Trojan68 20343AE1698C45FB3ECE073745D28D4C Trojan111 FDD95B4CC10B536934486C7D3FDEE04F 
Trojan26 e1c7eccc8fec00a10c1e0cd65e443635 Trojan69 eb19dfe2116be14283c254a16a786482 Trojan112 5ab2a67268b3362802a13594edafbd2e 
Trojan27 0864bc6951795b86d435176c3320a8bc Trojan70 ace2a3e0ca6bdfa6331a6e7d519ab1e7 Trojan113 32a34ce536ca62c61cc05ce3e3f3c54f 
Trojan28 0864bc6951795b86d435176c3320a8bc Trojan71 ace2a3e0ca6bdfa6331a6e7d519ab1e7 Trojan114 aab74722020e631147836fc009f9419d 
Trojan29 ab40142988527fe6ce585a9fdfce56ca Trojan72 dcc7f58bff80b337e5e7723b2ac9dad7 Trojan115 264E49C78F3693F4DEEBA9D62F3F5C89 
Trojan30 a68b72fbfb76964261a3601daa270647 Trojan73 d41421a918ce05632374081c33879d4c Trojan116 4ba35d78df77a4d5ad1207cdeeef78b3 
Trojan31 23964bc22c2c81f9a41fb9f747a6c995 Trojan74 461689d449c7b5a905c8404d3a464088 Trojan117 c66dfa4304d9782f19cab27379191f7a 
Trojan32 fd7b410fd7936dd51c4b72ef4047c639 Trojan75 02cfa3e6fdb4301528e5152de76b2abf Trojan118 cfeab92b4e304d188c3e6f81d6d6925b 
Trojan33 0316dbd20fbfd5a098cd8af384ca950f Trojan76 107a3bef0da9ab2b42e3e0f9f843093b Trojan119 741fad6dabdc81f485c6fbd8a8ce125d 
Trojan34 6e8f48e7d53ac2c8f7b863078e9050b2 Trojan77 4c7f72fc16ac8daf5237cfc4e5546ac0 Trojan120 dd93f9f9d2ec75096ed843e386d68f4c 
Trojan35 FC1E5521A5F2479EA3226288B6205300 Trojan78 107a3bef0da9ab2b42e3e0f9f843093b Trojan121 a8a42968a9bb21bd030416c32cd34635 
Trojan36 dcb019624fb8e92eb26adf2bef77d46c Trojan79 716d1dc7285b017c2dbc146dbb2e319c Trojan122 6bd532a798f5b473e4237342c3d4d580 
Trojan37 8b288305733214f8e0d95386d886af2d Trojan80 412ce577521a560459cd711f5966caf4 Trojan123 b4fb40b3dfa5780732d599eba6023309 
Trojan38 f9c00d3db5fa6cd33bc3cd5a08766ad0 Trojan81 818231cb0be9bf597d33013edb85e1a7 Trojan124 f71529ae0cab12fa089b91e333ac5d6f 
Trojan39 1fbf5be463ce094a6f7ad345612ec1e7 Trojan82 dd7adc5b140835dc22f6c95694f9c015 Trojan125 c97fcb5f276542ac719fef3d32fbd2bf 
Trojan40 D73D599EF434D7EDAD4697543A3E8A2B Trojan83 3fcc933847779784ece1c1f8ca0cb8e4 Trojan126 f23c05c44949c6c8b05ab54fbd9cee40 
Trojan41 d5e717617400b3c479228fa756277be1 Trojan84 d2f825ecfb3d979950b9de92cbe29286 Trojan127 75b6411071a27959394ffba9ecdea4a7 
Trojan42 d5e717617400b3c479228fa756277be1 Trojan85 af15ba558c07f8036612692122992aad 
  Trojan43 6932a004ce3ad1ad5ea30f43a31b0285 Trojan86 7008675da5c1b0a6b59834d125fafa45 
   
Appendix II 
Trojan Al-
located 
Name 
Banking Trojans Features 
Weaponisation Delivery 
Exploitation Installation 
C&C 
Data Exfil-
tration 
Host-
Based 
Evasion Anti-forensics 
Email Attachments 
          
  Rootkit 
Dead-
Code 
Utilising 
Packers 
Macros PDF(JS) API Hooking 
Heap 
Spraying 
DLL Side 
loading 
Hardcoded 
IP 
Domain 
Name 
Backdoors 
Trojan1 ✓       ✓       ✓   ✓ 
Trojan2 ✓     ✓   ✓     ✓   ✓ 
Trojan3 ✓     ✓         ✓   ✓ 
Trojan4 ✓     ✓   ✓     ✓   ✓ 
Trojan5 ✓     ✓   ✓     ✓   ✓ 
Trojan6         ✓   ✓   ✓   ✓ 
Trojan7 ✓       ✓   ✓   ✓   ✓ 
Trojan8 ✓       ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓ 
Trojan9       ✓         ✓     
Trojan10     ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan11     ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan12     ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan13     ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan14     ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan15     ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan16     ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan17     ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan18     ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan19     ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan20     ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan21     ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan22     ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan23     ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan24     ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan25     ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan26       ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan27     ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan28     ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓ 
Trojan29       ✓   ✓ ✓     ✓   
Trojan30       ✓   ✓ ✓     ✓   
Trojan31       ✓   ✓ ✓     ✓   
Trojan32       ✓   ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓ 
Trojan33       ✓   ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓ 
Trojan34   ✓ ✓ ✓         ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan35   ✓ ✓ ✓         ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan36       ✓   ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓ 
Trojan37       ✓   ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓ 
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Trojan38   ✓ ✓ ✓         ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan39   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓     ✓   
Trojan40   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓ 
Trojan41     ✓ ✓           ✓ ✓ 
Trojan42     ✓ ✓           ✓ ✓ 
Trojan43     ✓ ✓       ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan44     ✓ ✓       ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan45     ✓ ✓         ✓   ✓ 
Trojan46 ✓   ✓ ✓         ✓ ✓   
Trojan47     ✓ ✓         ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan48 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓   ✓ 
Trojan49 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓   ✓ 
Trojan50 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan51   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan52   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan53       ✓             ✓ 
Trojan54   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓   ✓ 
Trojan55   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓   ✓ 
Trojan56   ✓ ✓ ✓           ✓ ✓ 
Trojan57 ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan58   ✓   ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan59 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan60 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan61 ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan62 ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan63       ✓   ✓     ✓     
Trojan64       ✓               
Trojan65 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan66 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan67 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan68 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan69 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan70 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan71 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan72 ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan73     ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓     
Trojan74     ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓     
Trojan75     ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓     
Trojan76 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan77 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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Trojan78 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan79 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan80 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan81 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan82 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan83 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan84 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan85 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan86 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan87 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan88 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan89 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓   ✓ 
Trojan90 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓   ✓ 
Trojan91 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan92 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan93 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan94 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan95 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan96 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan97 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan98 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓     
Trojan99 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan100 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan101 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan102 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓   ✓ ✓     
Trojan103 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan104       ✓         ✓     
Trojan105 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan106 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan107 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan108       ✓         ✓     
Trojan109 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan110 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan111   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan112   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan113   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan114   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan115   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan116   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan117 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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Trojan118   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan119   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan120   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan121   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan122   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan123   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan124   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan125   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan126   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trojan127   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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